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The cardinal goal of decision neuro-
science is to identify the neural mech-
anisms that translate external rewards
into an internal sense of value (Rangel
et al., 2008; Huettel, 2010; Glimcher, 2011;
Rangel and Clithero, 2012). The brain
region most commonly associated with
“reward” has been the ventral striatum
(vStr, neurosynth.org forward inference,
1/2013). Studies of fMRI activation and
neuronal activity in the vStr have con-
verged on a standard model in which
the vStr computes a reward prediction
error [RPE (Schultz, 1997; Pagnoni et al.,
2002; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Bayer and
Glimcher, 2005)] that then facilitates the
learning of new associations (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). The RPE mechanism pro-
vides flexibility for encoding the relation-
ships between cues and positive rewards
across a wide dynamic range, but was his-
torically thought to ignore aversive stimuli
(Delgado et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001).
A strong split between representa-
tions of positively and negatively valued
stimuli would be consistent with evi-
dence from classical conditioning (Martin-
Soelch et al., 2007) and emotion (Russell,
1980) representation. But, it is inconsistent
with a growing body of research that indi-
cates that the vStr can represent themagni-
tude of value for both positive and negative
stimuli (Seymour et al., 2005, 2007; Carter
et al., 2009). Research by Brooks and col-
leagues (Brooks et al., 2010) has pointed
toward a way to reconcile this conflict-
ing evidence: negative expectations create
a baseline that allows two negative stimuli
to be distinguished in the vStr.
Brooks and colleagues presented par-
ticipants with a series of choices between
a constant number of electric shocks and
a number based on the outcome of a
gamble. The use of primary sensory stim-
uli in choice tasks is rare but poten-
tially valuable (O’Doherty et al., 2006).
Electric shocks in particular provide pri-
mary sensory input that is very aversive
and can take place in an entirely nega-
tive context (i.e., without the use of an
endowment). Prior to choice, on each
trial, participants were given a standard
number of shocks to establish a negative
expectation for each trial. The partici-
pants’ choices were then used to charac-
terize their utility curves. Consistent with
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), the convex shape of these curves
indicates that participants, in spite of their
preference for fewer shocks, still viewed
fewer shocks as a negative outcome. The
authors next show that the vStr not
only represents aversive choice options,
but also does so in a manner that is
counter to traditional salience arguments
(Blackburn et al., 1992; Salamone, 1994).
Less aversive—and therefore less salient—
options produce greater activations. This
surprising finding has important implica-
tions for how associations are learned and
subsequent choices are made.
By embedding local context in an RPE
framework, Brooks and colleagues can
explain two puzzles in the decision neu-
roscience literature. First, the lack of vStr
activation for aversive but unexpectedly
positive experiences can now be under-
stood as a problem with firing-rate sen-
sitivity. Negative stimuli that evoke low
firing rates can be extraordinarily difficult
to distinguish from one another. But, in
the local context provided by the negative
reference shocks, negative stimuli generate
higher overall firing rates and could be
easily distinguished.
Second, because these negative stimuli
can generate different representations in
vStr, the neural machinery responsible for
learning positive rewards can be co-opted
to choose the more positive of two neg-
ative options; widening the applicability
of temporal difference models of learning
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). The use of local
context in temporal difference learning has
been described in work on relief from pain
(Seymour et al., 2005), and is a potential
explanation for striatal representation of
monetary losses in one of our own stud-
ies where gain and loss contexts were held
constant within runs (Carter et al., 2009).
While being able to distinguish nega-
tive stimuli in using the vStr expands the
applicability of reinforcement models of
learning, a number of questions regarding
the representation of negative stimuli dur-
ing choice remain. Work from Hikosaka
and colleagues [reviewed in Bromberg-
Martin et al. (2010)] has indicated that
the vStr may also incorporate signal from
dopamine neurons, anatomically distinct
in origin, that fire more strongly to both
rewards and punishments. Such findings
raise the intriguing possibility that a sin-
gle experiment could reveal anatomically
distinct regions within the vStr that evince
distinct reward and salience coding—
following a clever manipulation of local
context. We also note that modern models
of decision value have difficulty predict-
ing choices for gambles containing mixed
outcomes that include potential gains and
losses (Payne, 2005). In order to address
these potential shortcomings, choice sets
consisting of true mixed gambles may
provide important methodological advan-
tages (Venkatraman et al., 2009).
Although much attention has been
paid to the representation of aversive
stimuli in the vStr, this study by Brooks
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and colleagues provides an important
and novel reminder: subtle differences
in experimental protocol can drastically
change the neural response to a simple
stimulus.
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